EchoStar (ECHO)

P/E is extremely high/meaningless as provided: 31.13 (ttm) with Forward P/E = “-” (missing). This typically indicates earnings volatility or temporary loss-like conditions; for a value investor, P/E alone is unreliable here.

PEG = 1.77 (provided). PEG near 1–2 can suggest price is not wildly disconnected from growth, but the underlying growth assumptions appear unstable given the conflicting/volatile EPS metrics below.

Price/Sales (P/S) = 1.83 and EV/Sales = 21.21. The EV/Sales number is very elevated versus P/S, implying the market is valuing the enterprise largely through debt/EV adjustments and/or that EBITDA is weak/unstable (also consistent with EV/EBITDA = “-”).

P/B = 2.88 and Book/sh = 5.34 with Cash/sh = 1.83 (both positive). P/B above 1 suggests the market expects above-book economics; however, ROE/ROIC values later show unusual magnitude/quality, so this is not a clean “cheap on book” situation.

P/C = 16.76 and P/FCF = “-” (not provided). Cash-flow valuation is not usable from the provided snapshot, limiting traditional value triangulation.

EPS (ttm) = 2.88, but EPS next Y = 0.07 and EPS this Y = 148.43% (growth metric) vs EPS past 3/5Y being highly negative/unstable. This combination signals highly inconsistent earnings power and/or one-off effects.

EPS Y/Y (ttm) = -1670.60% (very large negative). Such a drastic change strongly implies earnings recently deteriorated versus prior period or guidance/normalization issues exist.

Sales growth is also turbulent: Sales Y/Y TTM = -6.97% while Sales Q/Q = -88.23% (extreme). This points to revenue softness or lumpy timing.

Margins appear very weak/unstable: Gross Margin = -0.05%, Oper. Margin = -0.05% (effectively ~0/near-flat but slightly negative), Profit Margin = 58.46% (contradictory vs operating/gross). This indicates the profitability metrics are not internally consistent—either due to unusual accounting, discontinued operations, or data normalization differences; treat margins with caution.

Earnings figure is negative: Earnings = -1.08% (as given), and EPS/Sales Surprise = -38.71%. The latest reporting quality looks worse than expectations.

Profitability quality metrics: ROA = -1.08%, ROE = -11.42%, but ROIC = -33.48% (all negative). For a value investor, negative ROE/ROIC undermines durable capital efficiency. For a growth investor, negative ROIC reduces the odds that growth will translate into shareholder value.

EPS outlook is concerning for growth consistency: EPS next Y = 0.07 (very low relative to EPS ttm = 2.88). That suggests either sharp deterioration expected or that ttm EPS included unusual items.

Past growth signals are highly unstable: EPS past 3/5Y shows extreme negative/large swings (e.g., values like -161.79% and other very large negatives in the dataset).

Sales momentum is weak: Sales Y/Y TTM = -6.97% and Sales Q/Q = -88.23% (very weak quarter).

EPS Q/Q = -1670.60% indicates a material quarterly deterioration—this is the opposite of what you want for a clean growth thesis.

EPS next 5Y is shown as “-” (not provided), limiting long-range growth modeling.

Quick Ratio = 1.25 and Current Ratio = 2.88 indicate liquidity is likely adequate in the near term (able to cover short-term obligations). This is a positive from a balance-sheet safety perspective.

Debt metrics are problematic/very high: Debt/Eq = 5.12 and LT Debt/Eq = 5.20. High leverage can magnify downside if operating performance remains weak.

Cash/sh = 1.15 with Book/sh = 5.34 suggests the business has some liquid resources, but leverage is still large relative to equity.

Enterprise Value is much higher than Market Cap (EV 42.2B vs Market Cap 26.0B), consistent with meaningful debt and/or other enterprise value adjustments.

Net profitability is not supporting the leverage picture: ROIC and ROE are negative (per provided metrics), which increases the importance of execution and refinancing/solvency risk monitoring.

Insider Own = 0.74% (low). Insider ownership does not strongly align management incentives with shareholders—common for larger, institution-held names.

Insider Trans = “-” (not provided), so no clear signal on insider buying/selling trends.

Institutional ownership = 89.41% with Inst Trans = -39.28% (as provided). High institutional ownership can provide liquidity and monitoring, but negative institution transactions may indicate institutions have been reducing exposure.

Given low insider ownership and very high institutions, thesis quality likely depends on institutional sentiment and company execution rather than insider conviction.

Current Price = 89.41, Prev Close = 89.89 (Change % = -0.53%). Price is roughly flat on the day.

52W range: High = 131.00, Low = 65.76. Current price is mid-to-lower in the range, implying the market is still pricing risk.

Relative and absolute performance: Perf Month = +2.90%, but longer horizons are deeply negative (Perf 3Y = -17.75%, Perf 5Y = -23.63%, Perf 10Y = -2.58% with additional confusing fields). Overall, the longer-term track record is weak.

Beta = 0.99 suggests price volatility is roughly in line with the overall market (not unusually defensive or aggressive).

Volatility = 4.06 and ATR(14) = 2.92 indicate moderate day-to-day movement; not “penny-stock” chaos, but enough range to expect swings around earnings.

RSI(14) = 0.99 (as provided) is extremely low, often implying the stock is oversold or the metric is distorted by data issues. Treat as a potential oversold signal, not a guarantee of reversal.

Short Float = 20.10% with Short Interest = 6.56 and Short Ratio = 0.99 (values provided). This suggests meaningful short presence, which can amplify rallies if fundamentals improve.

Rel Volume = 0.74 with Avg Volume = 26.62M and Volume = 26.62M (approx; also provided). No major unusual volume spike is evident from the snapshot.